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Summary 
Congress created Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) in the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 to help 
workers and firms adjust to dislocation that may be caused by increased trade liberalization. It is 
justified now, as it was then, on grounds that the government has an obligation to help the 
“losers” of policy-driven trade opening. In addition, TAA is presented as an alternative to policies 
that would restrict imports, and so provides assistance while bolstering freer trade and 
diminishing prospects for potentially costly tension (retaliation) among trade partners. As in the 
past, critics strongly debate the merits of TAA on equity, efficiency, and budgetary grounds. 
Nonetheless, finding agreement on TAA remains important for forging a compromise on national 
trade policy. This report discusses the role of TAA in U.S. trade policy from its inception as a 
legislative option in the early 1950s to its core role as a cornerstone of modern trade policy that 
many argue has served to promote the long-term U.S. trade liberalization agenda. 
TAA was reauthorized through December 31, 2013, in the 112th Congress. Democratic leaders 
and the Obama Administration considered TAA a quid pro quo for passage of three implementing 
bills for free trade agreements (FTAs) with Colombia, Panama, and South Korea. There was, 
however, considerable partisan debate over the direction TAA should take. Congress had 
expanded TAA significantly in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009 
from an earlier version in the Trade Act of 2002. The issue before the 112th Congress was how to 
craft a compromise TAA bill that would receive bipartisan support in the both houses, and assure 
its passage along with the three implementing bills. Such an understanding was developed and 
became part of H.R. 2832, a bill to reauthorize the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). In 
an elaborate legislative procedure, both chambers passed the four trade bills on October 12, 2011. 
TAA reauthorization reflected a compromise that allowed for passage as part of a larger trade 
deal. Because it was understood that TAA was essential to move the three FTA implementing 
bills, both parties and houses of Congress eventually embraced this solution, albeit not 
unanimously. The bill reauthorized the workers, firms, and farmers programs through December 
31, 2013, but discontinued TAA for communities because it was considered duplicative of other 
federal programs. Many, but not all, of the enhanced programs and funding levels in the ARRA 
were reauthorized, including restoring eligibility to services workers and firms, increasing income 
support for workers undergoing job training, raising the Health Coverage Tax Credit, expanding 
funding for training benefits, and reinstituting more detailed program evaluation and reporting 
requirements. Funding was reduced from ARRA levels for job search, relocation assistance, and 
wage insurance for older workers. Public sector workers are no longer eligible for benefits. TAA 
eligibility is retroactive to the expiration date of the ARRA enhancements. The firms and farmers 
TAA programs were reauthorized at annualized levels of $16 million and $90 million, 
respectively, much less than in ARRA, but comparable to current (and historical) appropriated 
levels. 
Although many opponents of expanding TAA programs spoke out against the reauthorizing 
legislation, its ultimate passage once again suggests that TAA remains an integral part of the 
debate over trade liberalization. Without providing assistance to those hurt by trade liberalization, 
moving ahead with the trade policy agenda remains a difficult proposition, an outcome consistent 
with TAA legislative history since 1962. 
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Introduction 
When Congress passed the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act (RTAA) of 1934, it reflected an 
important transition in national trade policy away from “protectionism” toward greater “trade 
liberalization.” This shift continues to be the dominant, but hardly uncontested, trade policy of the 
United States. The substantial national gains from trade have long been recognized, yet trade 
liberalizing legislation often faces strong political opposition because related costs, although 
much smaller, affect a vocal and concentrated constituency. Congress first addressed this inherent 
tension with legislation that allowed higher tariffs and other trade barriers to be reimposed when 
domestic industries were threatened or hurt by imports. In 1962, however, Congress adopted an 
additional approach by providing trade adjustment assistance (TAA) directly to trade-affected 
firms and workers. It remains a much-debated, but enduring pillar of U.S. trade policy today. 
This report discusses the role of TAA in U.S. trade policy, from its inception as a legislative 
option in the early 1950s, to its core role as a cornerstone of modern trade policy that many argue 
has served to promote the long-term U.S. trade liberalization agenda. It will also consider the 
extent to which TAA has been linked to both renewal of trade agreements authority1 and trade 
agreement implementing legislation. This includes action taken on TAA in the 112th Congress as 
part of a grand trade bargain that included passage of implementing bills for free trade agreements 
(FTAs) with Colombia, Panama, and South Korea. Understanding the origins of TAA, the 
historical economic and congressional debate, and legislative options considered by Congress 
over the past 50 years may help inform the recurring discussion on TAA reauthorization. 
TAA Programs and Rationale 
TAA was first authorized in 1962, with two programs covering workers (e.g., retraining, 
relocation allowances, extended unemployment benefits) and firms (e.g., loans, loan guarantees, 
technical assistance, tax benefits). Congress added a communities program (e.g., loans and 
grants) in 1974, subsequently terminated in 1982, and a farmers program (technical assistance 
and cash benefits) in 2002. Congress authorized another communities program in 2009, but 
discontinued it two years later. All TAA programs are usually reauthorized in one bill, although 
administered by three different federal agencies. This discussion does not address details of the 
TAA programs, which are available in other CRS reports. Rather, it takes a holistic policy 
approach to the economic issue of federal assistance for adjustment to import penetration, with 
occasional reference to the large workers and much smaller firms programs, which have formed 
the core of TAA since its inception. 
Nearly eight decades after the RTAA became law, passage of three FTAs in the 112th Congress 
and President Obama’s National Export Initiative stand as reminders of the importance that the 
United States places on trade expansion, particularly of exports. The pursuit of export growth, 
however, generally cannot be done without conceding to a reciprocal increase in imports, and the 
                                                 
1 Trade agreements authority refers to the authority Congress conveys to the President to enter into reciprocal trade 
agreements. It began in 1934, and as the trade negotiation process became more complex, so too did this statutory 
authority. The complexity may be seen in the fast track rules created in the Trade Act of 1974, and further 
modifications made in subsequent trade bills, including the Trade Act of 2002, which provided for what is now referred 
to as trade promotion authority (TPA). For details, see CRS Report RL33743, Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) and 
the Role of Congress in Trade Policy, by J. F. Hornbeck and William H. Cooper. 
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tradeoff does not affect stakeholders equally. While freer trade can benefit exporters, consumers, 
and the economy as a whole, it can place hardship on some industries facing increased 
competition from imports.2 Freer trade is not entirely free, but bears the cost of economic 
adjustment. Supporters of TAA argue that workers (especially the permanently displaced) and 
firms hurt by imports, due in part to changes in trade policy, have more severe adjustment 
problems than others affected by different types of economic dislocation. Following this 
reasoning, these firms and workers deserve their own category of assistance, rather than relying 
on broader programs designed to address all types of economic dislocation.3  
The issues raised by TAA were identified early on in the postwar economic policy debate. 
Justification rested on arguments for (1) economic efficiency, by speeding the adjustment process 
and returning idle resources to work more quickly; (2) equity, by compensating for lost income 
while spreading the cost of freer trade to society as a whole; and (3) political pragmatism, by 
defusing opposition to trade liberalizing legislation. Additionally, the costs of trade liberalization 
were at first managed through temporary protection (e.g., escape clause and peril point 
provisions—see next section) to maintain a coalition in favor of freer trade. TAA was offered as a 
more constructive alternative. It would provide for positive adjustment rather than negative 
reaction to tariff reduction, with expectations that costs would be temporary for an adjustment 
period, and much less harmful than protectionist measures.4 
TAA skeptics challenged the logic of these claims. They argued that economic efficiency was far 
from guaranteed given that subsidies can operate to reduce worker and firm incentives to relocate, 
take lower-paying jobs, or in other ways seek a solution to being idled. Equity issues arose 
because many economic groups hurt by changing economic circumstances caused by other than 
trade policies were not afforded similar economic assistance. A frequently cited alternative argues 
that if society has a responsibility to help all those dislocated by economic change, then policies 
should not be narrowly restricted to trade-related or other categories of harm.5 
Administrative hurdles and costs were also considered high. Economists, among others, pointed 
to the methodological difficulties in defining and measuring injury from tariff reduction, arguing 
that solutions would be inexact, if not arbitrary.6 Previous studies suggest that many firms, even 
                                                 
2 For a brief but comprehensive summary, see J. David Richardson, “Uneven Gains and Unbalanced Burdens? Three 
Decades of American Globalization,” in The United States and the World Economy, ed. C. Fred Bergsten (Washington, 
DC: Institute for International Economics, 2005), pp. 111-118. 
3 The TAA debate has a long history. See, Clair Wilcox, “Victims of Tariff Cuts,” The American Economic Review, 
vol. 40, no. 5 (December 1950), pp. 884-889, C. Michael Aho and Thomas O. Bayard, “Costs and Benefits of Trade 
Adjustment Assistance,” in The Structure and Evolution of Recent U.S. Trade Policy, ed. Robert E. Baldwin and Anne 
O. Krueger (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), pp. 154-155, J. David Richardson, “Comment,” in The 
Structure and Evolution of Recent U.S. Trade Policy, pp. 192-193, and more recently, I. M. Destler, American Trade 
Politics, 4th ed. (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 2005), p. 327. 
4 For early renditions of TAA justification, see Richard A. Givens, “The Search for an Alternative to Protection,” 
Fordham Law Review, vol. 30, no. 1 (January 1, 1961), p. 20, William Diebold, Jr., The United States and the 
Industrial World: American Foreign Economic Policy in the 1970s (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1984), p. 150 and 
153, and J. David Richardson, “Comment,” pp. 192-193. 
5 Katherine Baicker and M. Marit Rehavi, “Policy Watch: Trade Adjustment Assistance,” Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, vol. 18, no. 2 (Spring 2004), pp. 251-252, Wilcox, Victims of Tariff Cuts, p. 889, Matthew J. Slaughter 
and Robert Z. Lawrence, “More Trade and More Aid,” The New York Times, June 10, 2011, and George F. Will, 
“Obama and Free Trade: Appease Big Labor,” The Washington Post, June 8, 2011. 
6 Wilcox, Victims of Tariff Cuts, p. 8845-889, C. Michael Aho and Thomas O. Bayard, “Costs and Benefits of Trade 
Adjustment Assistance,” pp. 153-155, 168-169, and 177, and George F. Will, “Obama and Free Trade, Appease Big 
Labor,” The Washington Post, June 8, 2011. 
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smaller ones, could adjust on their own, and that workers could just as well rely on more broadly 
available unemployment and retraining programs. In addition, over time, the costs of TAA would 
rise, diluting political support.7  
Political accommodation proved to be another factor for congressional support of TAA. Many 
Members concerned with the negative effects of trade have insisted on TAA to support trade 
liberalizing legislation, and TAA skeptics often conceded in order to advance the broader trade 
agenda. TAA provisions in the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 and the Trade Act of 1974 are often 
cited as providing the support necessary to conclude ground-breaking trade agreements like the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)8 Kennedy and Tokyo Rounds of the 1960s and 
1970s.9 TAA was also a quid pro quo for providing President Bush with TPA in 2002, and for 
passage of free trade agreement (FTA) implementing bills in the 112th Congress (see Appendix 
for legislative chronology). 
Antecedents to TAA 
TAA was a product of a time when U.S. domestic and foreign economic policies were shifting to 
address dire economic situations. The seeds for change were planted with the RTAA, a reaction to 
the tariff-raising Smoot-Hawley Act of 1930. The shift from protectionism toward greater trade 
opening was rooted partly in the prevailing belief that to escape the Great Depression, the 
domestic economy would be best served by boosting demand worldwide. In addition to the 
benefits of export expansion, trade policy embraced the idea that restricting imports ran the risk 
of mutually destructive global retaliation. The RTAA provided time-limited authority to the 
President to enter into reciprocal tariff-reducing agreements, without the need for congressional 
approval afterward. It was the early precursor to the now-expired Trade Promotion Authority 
(TPA). Still, the legislation was controversial, prompting resistance not only to the trade 
provisions, but to what some considered to be a concession to the President of traditional 
congressional authority over tariffs.10 
Within a few years, trade liberalization took on a stronger foreign policy rationale, as well. By 
1940, President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s State of the Union address had elevated U.S. trade policy 
to an “indispensible part of the foundations for any stable and durable world peace,”11 a view 
expressed in the shadows of an approaching world war that would soon devastate international 
commerce. As a result, the President had positioned trade policy as a key ingredient to 
reconstruction of the post-war economic system, both as a pillar of international stability, and a 
                                                 
7 TAA costs rose dramatically with the automobile retrenchment in the early 1980s, providing the Reagan 
Administration with ample room to reduce funding significantly. Aho and Bayard, “Costs and Benefits of Trade 
Adjustment Assistance,” pp. 184-185. It was also a key issue for the 112th Congress. 
8 GATT was the precursor to the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
9 Destler, American Trade Politics, pp. 296-298 and Congressional Quarterly, CQ Almanac 1998, pp. 18-3-18-9. 
10 Douglas A. Irwin, “From Smoot-Hawley to Reciprocal Trade Agreements: Changing the Course of U.S. Trade 
Policy in the 1930s,” in The Defining Moment: the Great Depression and the American Economy in the Twentieth 
Century, ed. Michael D Bordo, Claudia Goldin, and Eugene N. White (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 
pp. 340-346. 
11 Robert E. Baldwin, U.S. Trade Policy Since 1934: An Uneven Path Toward Greater Trade Liberalization, National 
Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 15397, Cambridge, October 2009, p. 2. 
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counterweight to encroaching Soviet communism. This stance took on even greater importance as 
the United States became the undisputed leader of the “free world” during the Cold War.12 
Nonetheless, trade liberalization remained contentious in Congress because the foreign policy 
imperative of supporting international stability ran headlong into concerns over protecting 
domestic industry from imports. Congressional testimony in the 1940s emphasized the renewed 
tilt toward protectionism, even as public opinion appeared more indifferent for two reasons. First, 
U.S. imports in a war-torn world were not large enough to present a serious threat to U.S. jobs 
and production. Second, trade was viewed as a key element of the Cold War strategy. And so, the 
lack of public concern over liberalizing commerce provided Congress with a window to take on 
multilateral trade negotiations (MTNs) under the newly created GATT.13 
Over time, however, as trade liberalization expanded, the need to address the concerns of import-
competing industries also grew. Two policies at the time dominated: the escape clause, first 
instituted by executive order under President Truman and later established in legislation; and the 
peril point provision.14 The escape clause allowed for the temporary reimposition of tariffs when 
fairly priced imports were proven or threatened to harm domestic industry. The peril point 
provision required the United States Tariff Commission (USTC) to evaluate the effects of tariff 
reductions, and determine a point at which tariffs might be reduced without doing harm to 
domestic producers.15 
Although President Eisenhower would continue to receive renewed trade agreements authority 
that allowed him to pursue tariff-reducing agreements, domestic pressure resulted in shorter 
extensions and more limited tariff cuts. Trade as foreign economic policy again found itself in 
tension with a domestic policy aimed at securing and maintaining the economic welfare of U.S. 
citizens at home. This policy tension opened the door to the earliest legislative vestiges of TAA in 
the early 1950s. While it would take more than a decade to become law, TAA legislation would 
eventually serve, at least in part, to reconcile these sometimes competing foreign and domestic 
economic policy priorities. 
The Randall Commission 
At the end of the Truman Administration, the Public Advisory Board for Mutual Security (the 
Bell Committee) made first mention of assistance to firms and workers facing increased 
competition from imports.16 Although little came from this proposal at the close of the Truman 
presidency, a year later TAA hit the spotlight in the report prepared by the 1953 Commission on 
Foreign Economic Policy, created by Congress as part of a one-year extension of the trade 
agreements authority legislation. Known as the Randall Commission, its appointed task was to 
                                                 
12 As quoted in, Robert E. Baldwin, U.S. Trade Policy Since 1934: An Uneven Path Toward Greater Trade 
Liberalization, p. 2. In fact, President Eisenhower would later write that trade expansion meant expansion in the “free 
world,” as a response to the Soviet Bloc. Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Document #908; To John Foster Dulles,” 
Department of State Bulletin, vol. 30, no. 763 (February 8, 1954), p. 187. 
13Robert A. Pastor, Congress and the Politics of U.S. Foreign Economic Policy (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1980), pp. 94-95; Diebold, The United States and the Industrial World, p. 151, and Destler, American Trade 
Politics, p. 7, 12-13. 
14 Pastor, Congress and the Politics of U.S. Foreign Economic Policy, p. 100. 
15 Baldwin, op. cit., pp. 5-7 and Irwin, op. cit., pp 347-349. 
16 Diebold, The United States and the Industrial World, p. 152. 
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recommend a long-term strategy for U.S. foreign economic policy. In addition to recommending a 
three-year extension of the Trade Agreements Act, it evaluated a proposal for “government 
assistance to communities, employers, and workers.” The report found TAA noteworthy in theory, 
but criticized and ultimately rejected it as too narrow an approach to economic dislocation by 
limiting assistance to groups affected only by lower import tariffs.17 
The proposal, drafted by commissioner David J. McDonald, president of the United Steel 
Workers, expressed concern that “unemployment caused by government action, as in the lowering 
of tariffs, should be of particular concern to the government,” particularly in times of economic 
slowdown.18 The plan called for temporary assistance to communities, companies, and workers 
threatened by imports, to be given in the form of technical and financial assistance. This approach 
would presumably encourage import-affected industries to diversify their output, and encourage 
communities to explore ways to expand employment opportunities with additional financing for 
privately supported industrial development corporations.19 
In a formal critique of the Randall Commission report, a group of noted economists 
acknowledged the historical precedent for government assistance in cases of policy-induced 
economic change, but reiterated a preference for responses that addressed the larger problem of 
economic dislocation rather than just the tariff issue. They also raised a number of pragmatic 
questions related to operating TAA programs.20 Two important legislative initiatives emerged 
from this effort. First, a report evaluating TAA was called for in legislation extending trade 
agreements authority to the President. Second, the following year, the first of a series of TAA bills 
would be introduced in the 83rd Congress. 
Early TAA Legislation 
Senator John F. Kennedy, who would eventually see TAA put into practice during his presidency, 
was an avid supporter of assistance to those negatively affected by trade. In the 83rd Congress, he 
introduced the Trade Adjustment Act of 1954 (S. 3650). The bill acknowledged the importance of 
international trade, but also the potential for localized adjustment problems, even when trade 
benefited the nation as a whole. The 83rd Congress did not act on this bill, but Senator Hubert 
Humphrey introduced an identical version in the 84th Congress. Originally introduced as a stand-
alone bill, it was subsequently attached as an amendment to H.R. 1. The bill extended trade 
agreements authority to the President, linking TAA to the authority of the President to enter into 
reciprocal trade agreements.21 
The Kennedy/Humphrey bills, among others, proposed that where a reduction in tariffs on 
competing articles “have been found either to threaten or to have caused serious injury to a 
domestic industry,” that a board consider application for assistance from firms, communities, 
industrial development corporations, employees, or organizations representing employees. Aid 
                                                 
17 U.S. Congress, House, Report to the President and the Congress, Commission of Foreign Economic Policy, prepared 
by Chairman Clarence B. Randall, 83rd Cong., 2nd sess., January 23, 1954, H. Doc. 290 (Washington: GPO, 1954), p. 
54. 
18 Ibid., p. 55. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Klaus Knorr and Gardner Patterson, A Critique of the Randall Commission Report (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1954), pp. 29-33. 
21 Other bills would be introduced in the 86th Congress before becoming law in the 87th Congress. 
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would be limited to a period of adjustment and was not to be considered a permanent subsidy. 
The goal was to respond to negative effects of a liberal trade policy without resorting to 
protectionist policies.22 As would be the fate of future TAA bills in the 1950s, Congress took no 
action, but TAA became increasingly solidified as part of the U.S. trade policy debate. 
Both the Democratic and Republican platforms of the 1960 presidential election placed foreign 
economic relations at the center of their agendas. The Democratic platform included a specific 
appeal for TAA as part of an expanded trade policy. The Republican platform, by contrast, had no 
such proposal, giving added weight to the escape clause and peril point provision.23 The GATT 
Dillon Round was concluded in 1961, in which the United States agreed to cut the tariffs on 61 
items below their peril point.24 This development marked a departure from earlier, more cautious 
negotiated positions which, coupled with high U.S. unemployment, created a policy environment 
conducive to assisting trade-affected constituents.25 
Trade Expansion Act of 1962 
The global market expanded briskly following World War II, and the growing importance of the 
then-European Economic Community (EEC) nudged U.S. policy further toward trade 
liberalization. Forming a trade pact with one of the most important markets in the world was not 
only considered an economic imperative, but central to achieving lasting world peace by defusing 
tension over protectionist policies. The United States also faced balance of payments pressures, 
modest unemployment, and the growing Communist threat, so trade policy had become an 
essential ingredient of foreign economic policy. In this light, many considered the Trade 
Expansion Act of 1962 to be the most important legislative initiative of the 87th Congress.26 
The 1962 Trade Act not only gave the President unprecedented “tariff-cutting authority,” 
particularly with respect to a critical trade partner, but added a whole new approach to dealing 
with domestic resistance to trade liberalization—trade adjustment assistance. TAA stood in 
contrast to the escape clause and peril point (the latter dropped in the 1962 act). These options 
were well honed in the 1950s, despite pressure by the executive branch to limit their use. TAA 
was also a different and more highly targeted approach than the escape clause, focusing on 
specific firms and workers, rather than an entire industry, hurt by “concessions granted under 
trade agreements.” TAA was offered in the form of increased and extended unemployment 
benefits, retraining and relocation allowances, loans and technical assistance for firms, and 
special tax deductions.27 
TAA shifted the trade debate by acknowledging more fully in legislation the costs of trade 
liberalization. It was also politically effective, generating support from labor constituencies 
                                                 
22 S. 3650, The Trade Adjustment Act of 1954, and Sen. Humphrey, “Extension of the Trade Agreements Act- 
Amendments,” Senate bill introduction, Congressional Record, vol. 101, part 3 (March 30, 1955), pp. 3997-3998. 
23 John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, The American Presidency Project, Santa Barbara, CA. Available at 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid29602. 
24 Congressional Quarterly. “The Trade Expansion Act: President Receives Unique Tariff-Cutting Rights and 
Adjustment Program After Carefully Planned Campaign,” CQ Almanac 1962 p. 259. 
25 Ibid., 261. 
26 Ibid., p. 263-264. 
27 P.L. 87-794, Title III and ibid., pp. 249, 255-256. 
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without turning to more protectionist responses. It is notable that a relatively lengthy and broad 
“negotiating authority” was achieved in a bill that also included TAA for the first time. Despite 
passage with bipartisan support, it was, nonetheless, the most controversial aspect of the bill. The 
House mounted stiff resistance to TAA from Republicans and some conservative Democrats, who 
objected to special treatment for tariff-affected workers and firms, and who sought a separate vote 
on TAA. Despite this effort, the bill was debated under a closed rule, prohibiting amendments, 
and passed with bipartisan support, despite a majority of House Republicans voting against it. 
The Senate rejected attempts to delete or modify the TAA provisions, and proceeded to pass the 
bill with broad support and only minor amendments.28 
The 1962 Trade Act also changed the nature of trade legislation. In recognizing the need to 
address domestic concerns as part of trade liberalization, Congress and President Kennedy 
incorporated TAA into broader trade policy. Previously, Congress concerned itself with (1) 
conveying a specific trade agreements authority to the President, which in turn (2) would lead to 
new trade agreements, without the need for further congressional action. After 1962, it would 
become difficult to consider new trade agreements authority without taking up TAA, and it 
became increasingly likely that prospects for congressional support for new trade agreements 
would also hinge on such an accommodation. 
The Failure of TAA: 1963-1974 
TAA initially achieved one goal: greater support from labor groups for trade liberalization. By 
1971, as the U.S. balance of trade turned to deficit for the first time since 1888, and perceptions 
of lost income and jobs to foreign competition grew, this support began to erode. The failure of 
TAA to provide significant relief from imports in its first decade of operation added to labor’s 
concerns. From 1963 until 1969, not one of the 6 worker or 12 industry-wide petitions for TAA 
led to assistance. The eligibility criteria were tough to meet, requiring demonstration that the 
imported article was increasing, that the increase “was caused in major part” by the tariff 
reduction, and that the increase was the “major cause” of injury to the firm or worker. The 
multistep process also took months to complete and was costly for the applicants.29 
In hindsight, the inability to demonstrate injury and the laborious administrative procedures 
combined with strict U.S. Tariff Commission (USTC) rulings led to a deepening dissatisfaction 
with TAA. Although USTC adjudication would become more relaxed in the early 1970s, and the 
number of affirmative rulings would rise, they were still only a fraction of total petitions, and the 
political tide had already turned on TAA.30 Pressure mounted to address programmatic 
deficiencies, but by 1972 organized labor formally rejected the program for the time being. In 
hearings before the House Subcommittee on Foreign Economic Policy of the House Committee 
on Foreign Affairs, leaders of the AFL-CIO came out against the program, as well as trade 
liberalization in general. The sentiment is reiterated by one trade expert: “So in the first 30 
postwar years, import-affected industries that played the trade policy game by the legal rules 
                                                 
28 Ibid., p. 277. 
29 Charles R. Frank, Jr., Foreign Trade and Domestic Aid (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1977), pp. 4-5 
and 40-47. Other administrative relief from imports such as the escape clause and anti-dumping rules also proved to be 
difficult to obtain. 
30 Dominic Sorrentino, “Trade Adjustment Assistance to Workers Displaced by Imports, Fiscal 1963-73,” U.S. 
Department of Labor, Monthly Labor Review, Washington, DC, January 1974, pp. 63-65. 
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generally lost out” and pressure mounted for Congress to intervene directly for constituents, an 
option that the trade remedy rules “were intended to avoid.”31 
Critics called for major adjustments to the TAA eligibility criteria and administrative procedures, 
but the Nixon Administration offered a trade bill that actually diminished TAA. As the bill wound 
its way through Congress, however, both the House and the Senate not only restored all TAA 
benefits, but increased them and made changes that would facilitate program implementation. 
This was accomplished in the Trade Act of 1974, one of the most far-reaching trade bills in U.S. 
history.32 
Trade Act of 1974 
Unlike in 1962, TAA was not the most controversial trade issue in 1974, although Congress still 
paid it considerable attention. Despite intentions to the contrary, TAA had so far done little to 
encourage retraining or relocation of workers, and few firms capable of recovery received 
meaningful assistance. Providing additional unemployment insurance was its most noted 
accomplishment, and not one deemed by some as particularly effective in addressing injury from 
imports. Although numerous bills were introduced that would address many of TAA’s perceived 
weaknesses, Congress passed none of them until TAA was once again united with the major 1974 
trade bill providing for renewal of trade agreements authority. Originally crafted by the Nixon 
Administration, the draft trade bill acknowledged the deficiencies of the TAA program, and 
effectively gutted it. Congress, however, decided to retool rather than retire the program.33 
Among the major changes, the eligibility criteria were made less stringent so that imports no 
longer had to be the “major factor” of threatened or actual dislocation, meaning more important 
than all other causes combined. Congress replaced this test with criteria requiring demonstration 
that a significant number of workers had lost their jobs, that a firm’s sales had decreased, imports 
had increased, and that the imports “contributed importantly” to the declines. Determinations also 
were moved to the U.S. Department of Labor and the U.S. Department of Commerce for workers 
and firms, respectively, leaving escape clause determination to the newly named U.S. 
International Trade Commission (USITC). Requiring the two departments to act within 60 days 
versus six months for the USITC often made the TAA option preferable to escape clause action.34 
Other notable changes included adding a new program for communities, increasing worker and 
firm benefits, and providing special assistance for older displaced workers, or those who tend to 
make up a larger portion of plant closings compared to layoffs.35 Congress also included strong 
language indicating its intent that the program be used as a meaningful form of relief from 
                                                 
31 I. M. Destler, American Trade Politics, p. 140. See also, Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Howard F. Rosen, Trade Policy 
for Troubled Industries (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1986), p. 35.  
32 Charles R. Frank, Jr., Foreign Trade and Domestic Aid, p. 5. 
33 Ibid., pp. 70-71 and Congressional Quarterly, “Congress Clears Trade Bill on Final Day,” CQ Almanac 93rd 
Congress, 1974, pp. 553-562, and Pastor, Congress and the Politics of U.S. Foreign Economic Policy, p. 143. 
34 Ibid and P.L. 87-794, §301. 
35 Plant closings do not discriminate among employees, and so capture older and more experienced workers who often 
make up much of the work force. By contrast, layoffs, which are generally based on seniority, tend to affect younger 
workers disproportionally. 
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imports.36 In the end, the Trade Act of 1974, known for its dramatic changes in how trade 
agreements would be considered under new expedited procedures, also provided a congressional 
imprint of support for TAA by carefully considering ways to enhance the program, and ensuring 
its prominence by linking it to the major trade bill providing renewed trade agreements authority 
to the President. 
The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 and the 1980s 
In 1979, U.S. trade policy took a major step with ratification of the GATT Tokyo Round of 
multilateral trade negotiations. For TAA, however, it marked the beginning of a long period of 
decline. Separate legislation to extend and expand the program passed the House, but failed to 
move through the Senate.37 Although Congress eventually reauthorized the program, by the early 
1980s, TAA had become a victim of its own growth, negative program evaluations, and changing 
political and economic priorities. The declining automobile industry proved to be one catalyzing 
factor in its demise. The slowing economy and increased Japanese imports led to large layoffs and 
related “explosion of TAA claims,” which at the time resulted in historically generous benefits. 
This combination multiplied TAA program costs to the extent that President Carter, generally a 
supporter, expressed concern over the budgetary impact. Although he agreed to a two-year 
extension, TAA could not escape the impending deep budget cutting of the incoming Reagan 
Administration.38 
Congress extended TAA in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, but the act reduced 
benefits and eliminated $2.6 billion from the budget. Detractors cited as cause a General 
Accounting Office (GAO) report that challenged the program’s effectiveness to bring about 
adjustment rather than simply pay out additional benefits.39 High unemployment provided a 
reason for Congress to support TAA, but Congress extended it only through FY1983, again with 
much diminished finances and tightened standards for eligibility, particularly for unemployment 
benefits. By 1983, the Reagan Administration openly sought to terminate the program (as did his 
successor President George H. W. Bush), which was spared in reduced form by a congressional 
extension through FY1985.40 
After two very short extensions and a three-month lapse, TAA was finally extended for six years, 
through FY1991, as part of deficit-reduction legislation passed in 1986. Its programs were again 
trimmed with, for example, the elimination of all loans, loan guarantees, and other direct financial 
assistance to firms, providing only technical assistance, the basis of the firm program today. It 
received additional extensions first through FY1993 in the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness 
Act (OTCA) of 1988, and second, through FY1998 in the budget reconciliation bill of 1993 (see 
the Appendix).41 The lengthy extensions appeared to be inversely proportional to the budgetary 
effort in the bills. 
                                                 
36 Charles R. Frank, Jr., Foreign Trade and Domestic Aid, pp, 63-67. 
37 Congressional Quarterly, Inc., “Trade Adjustment Assistance,” CQ Almanac 1979, pp. 327-328. 
38 Ibid., and Destler, American Trade Politics, p. 150. 
39 Congressional Quarterly Inc., Trade: U.S. Trade Policy Since 1945, Washington, DC, 1984, pp. 23-69. 
40 Congressional Quarterly, Inc., “Trade Adjustment Aid Cut,” CQ Almanac 1983, pp. 251. 
41 Congressional Quarterly Inc., “Trade Adjustment Aid,” CQ Almanac 1986, p. 351. 
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In short, beginning in the 1980s, TAA came under severe pressure. Evaluations criticized the 
program’s effectiveness and rising costs, making it more difficult to support, even as a form of 
leverage to promote trade liberalization. TAA was also caught up in the deficit reduction 
negotiations, losing much of the clout it may have had years before, when it was part of finding 
compromise in broader trade and foreign policy debates. Two of its longest extensions were for 
much reduced program commitments, both done in budget rather than trade bills, where it was 
divorced from its primary policy rationale. But even within the trade policy debate, emphasis was 
shifting back toward import relief, as seen in the rise of special protection in the form of 
voluntary export restraints (VERs), and countervailing duty (CVD) and antidumping (AD) 
petitions. These became core negotiating objectives during future GATT rounds, temporarily 
relegating TAA to the back seat of the trade policy debate.42 
NAFTA and the Trade Act of 2002: TAA Expansion 
The major trade events of the 1990s, occurring relatively early in the decade, were passage of the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the GATT Uruguay Round. Negotiations to 
implement NAFTA were well underway during the 1992 presidential campaign and were 
highlighted in the debates. Newly elected President Clinton oversaw the implementation of 
NAFTA, but did so only after a number of conditions were attached, including TAA.43 NAFTA 
reinvigorated TAA by including a separate program (NAFTA-TAA) that applied only to 
dislocation related to increased trade with Mexico and Canada. This limited case was the only 
time that a TAA program has been authorized in an FTA implementing bill, which Congress 
passed in December 1993. Four months earlier, Congress had already extended the general TAA 
programs for a five-year period as part of the omnibus budget reconciliation bill.44 
In 1999, Congress extended TAA through 2001, at which point it lapsed until reauthorized for 
five years as part of the Trade Act of 2002. TAA played a major role again in the 2002 debate 
over the extension of trade agreements authority to President Bush (renamed Trade Promotion 
Authority—TPA). President Bush and the Republicans pushed hard to renew the long-expired 
authority, but Democrats were unwilling to provide it unless TAA was reauthorized. With the 
apparent need for a quid pro quo, the House Ways and Means Committee, under Republican 
leadership, offered a TAA bill first. The Senate Finance Committee drafted its own TAA bill, and 
agreement was tentatively struck to keep the votes separate on TAA and TPA.45 
After a lengthy and exhaustive legislative process, however, the final bill that would become the 
Trade Act of 2002 incorporated TAA, TPA, and a host of other trade issues. Despite Republican 
opposition to the TAA language, Congress revised and expanded TAA programs for five years, 
through September 30, 2007. Among the key new features, the bill merged NAFTA-TAA with the 
general program, created government-subsidized health insurance (Health Coverage Tax Credit) 
for dislocated workers, altered eligibility criteria to include secondary or downstream workers 
affected by imports, and added a new program for farmers. The bill as a whole passed in a tense, 
                                                 
42 Destler, American Trade Politics, p. 128 and Hufbauer and Rosen, Trade Policy for Troubled Industries, pp. 36-39. 
43 John M. Rothgeb Jr., U.S. Trade Policy: Balancing Economic Dreams and Political Realities (Washington, DC: 
Congressional Quarterly Inc., 2001), p. 205. 
44 Congressional Quarterly Inc., CQ Almanac 1993, pp. 137-175. 
45 Congressional Quarterly, Inc., “Victory for Bush on Fast Track,” CQ Almanac 2002, pp. 18-3 - 18-5. 
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close, and some have argued, a bipartisan vote.46 At this juncture, TAA had once again worked its 
way into the center of the trade policy debate and trade-related legislation. 
TAA in the New Millennium 
In the intervening years since the Trade Act of 2002, Congress debated TAA reform with an eye 
on making it more responsive to the complex economic challenges of “globalization.” Congress 
did not complete legislative action intended to reauthorize and revise TAA programs prior to their 
expiration on September 30, 2007. As an interim measure, on September 25, 2007, it passed a 
simple extension through the end of the calendar year (P.L. 110-89). 
Competing visions along party lines, however, prevented more comprehensive legislation from 
passing in either the 110th or 111th Congresses. In the 110th Congress, House Democrats drafted 
the Trade and Globalization Assistance Act of 2007 (H.R. 3920). It offered a revised approach to 
TAA that emphasized expanding eligibility to services workers and firms, public sector workers, 
and industry-wide applicants. It would have eliminated the 2002 requirement that shifts in 
production be related to specific trade agreements and provided more flexible training 
opportunities, as well as stricter evaluation requirements. The bill also would have raised program 
benefits, including higher authorizations for all TAA programs and increased health coverage tax 
credit and longer income support.47 
Many House Republicans and the Bush Administration supported TAA reauthorization, but came 
out against the Democratic option, offering a substitute version instead. They took issue with both 
the expanded eligibility and spending levels, arguing that they failed to make the needed reforms 
in efficiency, flexibility, oversight, and program delivery that would make TAA more useful and 
cost effective. The Republican position also pressed for tying TAA reauthorization to legislation 
that would renew TPA and implement bills for the then-pending FTAs with Colombia, Panama, 
and South Korea, whereas the Democrats argued that TAA should be reauthorized apart from 
these issues.48 
The House Ways and Means Committee reported favorably on the bill, but the votes on the 
chairman’s language and multiple amendments offered by Republicans were taken along party 
lines. The full House passed H.R. 3920 on October 31, 2007. The bill was sent to the Senate for 
consideration, where a companion (but not identical) bill (S. 1848) had been introduced. The 
Senate, however, did not take up a TAA bill and program authorizations expired on December 31, 
2007. In not reauthorizing TAA, the 110th Congress instead provided short-term funding through 
consolidated appropriation bills to keep the TAA programs running (see Appendix for legislative 
chronology).49 
                                                 
46 Ibid., and U.S. Congress, House Committee on Ways and Means, Subcommittee on Trade, Trade Act of 2002, 
Conference Report to accompany H.R. 3009, 107th Cong., 2nd sess., July 26, 2002, H.Rept. 107-624 (Washington: 
GPO, 2002), pp. 14-25. Final action on the conference report included passage along party lines in the House, 215-212, 
and in the Senate 63-34, with Democrats split, but the Republicans overwhelmingly in support. 
47 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Ways and Means, Trade and Globalization Assistance Act of 2007, Report 
together with Minority Views to accompany H.R. 3920, 110th Cong., 1st sess., October 29, 2007, H.Rept. 110-414 Part 
1 (Washington: GPO, 2007), pp. 35-37. 
48 Ibid., pp. 116-129. 
49 Inside U.S. Trade, Stimulus Package May Include TAA Reauthorization and Expansion, January 9, 2009. 
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The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 
2009 and TAA Revision 
In the 111th Congress, consideration of TAA reauthorization coincided with the U.S. economy 
falling into a deep recession following an unprecedented financial crisis. Congress responded 
with passage of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009. This act became 
the legislative and budgetary vehicle to move TAA revisions that had been developed over the 
previous years. Basic disagreements over the substance of the TAA bill remained, but Congress 
reauthorized the Trade and Globalization Adjustment Assistance Act (TGAAA) of 2009 as part of 
the larger ARRA bill. It extended the programs through December 31, 2010, and revamped them 
using a revised version of the framework developed in the 110th Congress. This framework 
included eligibility for service workers and firms, a new communities program, an increased 
Health Coverage Tax Credit for dislocated workers, and additional funding for all programs, 
among other changes.50 
At the close of 2010, as TAA programs were about to expire again, Congress extended them 
through February 12, 2012, as part of the Omnibus Trade Act of 2010.51 Higher authorization 
levels and expanded provisions of the ARRA, however, were only extended through February 12, 
2011, although TAA programs continued to operate at their pre-ARRA levels until early February 
2012. When the ARRA provisions expired, a basic controversy reopened, largely along partisan 
lines. Supporters of the expanded TAA saw the TGAAA-passed reforms as long-sought 
permanent changes needed to modernize TAA for the 21st Century. TAA detractors viewed the 
lapsed expansion of TAA reforms as the appropriate outcome of a limited-life stimulus bill. The 
debate took on new life early in the next Congress. 
TAA Reauthorization and Trade Agreements in the 
112th Congress 
At the beginning of the 112th Congress, TAA program authorizations were set to expire on 
February 13, 2012. Basic disagreements over TAA remained entrenched in Congress, with a 
strong Democratic base arguing for continued revision and expansion, and many Republican 
Members voicing either strong opposition to the concept and programs, or support for a different 
set of reforms. TAA proponents reiterated the need to assist those hurt by “trade and 
globalization,” while opponents increased their critique of TAA for its lack of effectiveness and 
high costs.52 Budgetary considerations loomed in the background of all these discussions, as did 
intensifying debate over passage of implementing legislation for free trade agreements (FTAs) 
with Colombia, Panama, and South Korea (KORUS). 
Despite many partisan disagreements, the desire to find a path forward on passage of TAA and the 
FTA implementing bills gained momentum. As in times past, TAA became the linchpin for 
                                                 
50 For a detailed explanation of the bill, see U.S. Congress, House Committee of Conference, Conference Report, to 
accompany H.R. 1, 111th Cong., 1st sess., February 12, 2009, Rept. 111-10 (Washington: GPO, 2009), pp. 653-694. 
51 P.L. 111-344. 
52 Inside U.S. Trade, ATPEDA, TAA Extension Likely Deadlocked, Business Worries About Fallout, February 11, 2011. 
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legislative action on major trade bills. Two issues had to be resolved if legislation was to move 
forward. First, Congress had to write a TAA bill that would garner sufficient bipartisan support in 
both houses. Second, because of strong differences of opinion and increasing distrust between 
legislative and executive branches, a legislative path was needed that would ensure passage of all 
three implementing bills and the TAA legislation, in tandem.53 
Legislative Procedure 
TAA reauthorization was first attached to the Senate draft implementing bill for the KORUS 
agreement as a way to ensure that TAA would pass with the FTA implementing bills. As a 
legislative vehicle, however, this approach presented a number of complications. First, FTA 
implementing bills considered under TPA legislation require that they contain only provisions 
changing laws or providing new statutory authority that are “necessary or appropriate” to 
implement the agreement, raising the question for some as to whether the TAA provisions met 
this standard.54 Second, many Members in both parties and houses of Congress had varying 
viewpoints on each of the FTAs and TAA, and so preferred four separate votes. These 
fundamental disagreements revealed themselves in a party-line vote on approval of the KORUS 
agreement in the Senate Finance Committee “mock markup.”55 The House version of the draft 
implementing bills for the FTAs did not include a TAA provision, leading to another round of 
party line votes in the Ways and Means Committee “mock markup.”56 
To address myriad concerns and the potential for deadlock, congressional leaders and the White 
House developed an elaborate alternative that virtually ensured expeditious passage of all four 
bills. Congress settled on introducing four separate bills: TAA reauthorization (H.R. 2832); 
Colombia FTA implementation (H.R. 3078); Panama FTA implementation (H.R. 3079); and 
South Korea FTA implementation (H.R. 3080). Moving the bills involved fast-paced and highly 
nuanced procedures.57 
The process began on September 7, 2011, with House passage of a bill to reauthorize the 
Generalized System of Preferences (H.R. 2832). The bill was sent to the Senate, where it was 
amended with the addition of what would become Title II, the Trade Adjustment Assistance Act 
of 2011. On September 22, 2011, the Senate agreed to the amended bill, 70-27, after which it was 
                                                 
53 Inside U.S. Trade, Scope, Timing of TAA Renewal Complicates Path Forward for Trade Deals, April 14, 2011, and 
International Trade Reporter, Hatch Challenges Assistance Link to FTAs at Finance Committee Hearing on Panama, 
June 2, 2011. 
54 This point alone engendered considerable disagreement. Supporters of this approach noted that NAFTA 
implementing legislation included TAA provisions. Opponents pointed to such provisions as being NAFTA-specific, 
not applying to reauthorization of the overall TAA program, which had been done three months earlier in separate 
legislation. The “necessary or appropriate” language, however, is subject to congressional interpretation, and opinions 
differ as to whether the NAFTA-TAA example constitutes an exception or precedent for inclusion of TAA in an FTA 
implementing bill. 
55 Inside U.S. Finance Approves FTAs, TAA at Mock Markup, Rejects All Amendments, July 8, 2011. 
56 International Trade Daily, House Ways and Means Backs FTAs in Party Line Vote, July 8, 2011. 
57 TAA faced at least two hurdles given Republican opposition. First, once introduced, the FTA implementing bills had 
to be voted on, but TAA was subject to consideration under normal rules. Therefore, if TAA did not pass ahead of these 
bills, there was no leverage or certainty that it would be approved afterward in the Republican House. Second, Senate 
action could not be guaranteed either given the possibility of filibuster. The legislative procedures that were agreed 
upon included having the Senate act first on TAA. Along with House Republican assurances, these procedures were 
intended to minimize, if not eliminate, the possibility on inaction on TAA. 
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sent to the House. In separate action, President Obama sent the three FTA implementing bills to 
both houses of Congress.58 The House Ways and Means Committee favorably reported out the 
three FTA implementing bills on October 3, 2011. On October 6, 2011, the House Committee on 
Rules issued a closed rule covering all four bills.59 
On October 12, 2011, both the House and the Senate acted to complete passage of all trade bills. 
The House passed the three implementing bills in quick succession, sending them to the Senate 
for approval later that evening. The House then took up H.R. 2832, as amended and passed in the 
Senate. It was considered under a rule that waived all points of order and allowed for one hour of 
debate.60 The House passed H.R. 2832 by a vote of 307-122, approving TAA reauthorization with 
bipartisan support. President Obama signed the bill into law on October 21, 2011 (P.L. 112-40). 
The Compromise TAA Bill 
Congressional leaders and the White House agreed on a compromise TAA bill (the Trade 
Adjustment Assistance Act of 2011) that found a middle ground between the provisions in the 
Trade Act of 2002 and the TGAAA. Despite lingering opposition by some, it was broadly 
understood that TAA was essential to move the FTA implementing bills, so both parties and 
houses of Congress eventually came to accept this solution and passed them all. 
The TAA bill reauthorized the workers, firms, and farmers programs through December 31, 2013. 
TAA for communities was discontinued because it was considered duplicative of other federal 
programs, but one component, the trade adjustment assistance community college and career 
trading grants, was retained.61 Many, but not all, of the enhanced programs and funding levels 
contained in the ARRA were reauthorized, including renewing eligibility for services workers and 
firms, increasing income support for workers undergoing job training, setting the Health 
Coverage Tax Credit at 72.5%, expanding funding for training benefits, and reinstituting more 
detailed program reporting and evaluation requirements. 
There were some funding reductions from ARRA levels for job search, relocation assistance, and 
wage insurance for older workers. Public sector workers were dropped as eligible for benefits.62 
Eligibility is retroactive to the expiration date of the ARRA enhancements. The firms and farmers 
TAA programs were reauthorized at annualized levels $16 million and $90 million, respectively, 
less than in ARRA, but comparable to current (and historical) appropriated levels. 
Although many opponents of expanding TAA programs spoke out against the reauthorizing 
legislation, its ultimate passage once again suggests that TAA remains an integral part of the 
                                                 
58 Because TAA legislation on its own would be considered a revenue bill, it could not originate in the Senate. To have 
the Senate act first on TAA required a legislative vehicle originating in the House that could then be amended in the 
Senate, in this case, the bill to extend the Generalized System of Preferences.  
59 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Rules, Providing for Consideration of the Senate Amendment to the Bill (H.R. 
2832) to Extend the Generalized System of Preferences and for Other Purposes, Report to accompany H.Res. 425, 
112th Cong., 1st sess., October 6, 2011, H.Rept. 112-240 (Washington: GPO, 2011), pp. 1-3. 
60 Ibid. 
61 CRS Report R42661, Trade Adjustment Assistance Community College and Career Training Grants, by Benjamin 
Collins. 
62 For details on the large workers program, see CRS Report R42012, Trade Adjustment Assistance for Workers, by 
Benjamin Collins 
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debate over trade liberalization. Without providing assistance to those hurt by trade liberalization, 
moving ahead with the trade policy agenda remains a difficult proposition, an outcome consistent 
with congressional voting trends on trade legislation since 1962. 
Outlook 
Some 50 years after its inception, TAA remains a hotly debated topic in Congress. Despite 
partisan disagreements on how best to structure, if even retain TAA programs, moving ahead with 
trade liberalizing legislation still requires compromise that includes TAA. Nonetheless, a 
lingering disagreement exists as to whether TAA and TPA should be tied together in legislation. 
One perspective argues that TPA should have been included with TAA renewal, and its absence 
was sufficient reason to vote against TAA. History could be interpreted as supportive of this 
notion. TAA began and, for its first two decades of existence, received its staunchest support 
when included in trade agreements authority legislation. This was also the case for the Trade Act 
of 2002. TAA, however, has also been reauthorized in standalone and appropriations bills in 
addition to major trade legislation. 
In part, reauthorizing legislation for TAA has varied in type for many reasons. Although TAA has 
been an important component of the “national trade policy” debate, TAA reauthorization bills 
have not always coincided with the granting of trade agreements authority or TPA. For example, 
at times when there has either been a long renewal of TPA (e.g., 1979-1988), or no renewal for an 
extended period of time (e.g., 1993-2002), Congress has reauthorized expiring TAA programs 
without including TPA. 
On the other hand, 50 years of history suggest that the debate on TAA tends to return to 
congressional consideration of broader trade liberalizing legislation—the granting of TPA. 
Congress often takes this as the appropriate time to amend or extend TAA, in no small part 
because of the fundamental need to find a balanced political outcome on legislation that gives rise 
to the basic issue of the cost of freer trade. The reverse, attaching TPA to TAA legislation, has not 
been common. Nonetheless, with TAA receiving relatively short extensions in recent years, it is 
possible that future trade debates may see these two issues reunited. 
By comparison, TAA has generally not been included as part of the debate over the consideration 
of implementing legislation for reciprocal free trade agreements. Often such legislative action 
occurs in a period following lengthier extensions of both TPA and TAA, and so there is little or no 
need to address TAA in an implementing bill. The lengthy delay from signing the three FTAs to 
consideration of implementing legislation in the 112th Congress is one factor that altered this 
particular legislative situation. In the end, Congress decided that the easier course was to keep the 
implementing bills free of provisions that might be challenged as extraneous under TPA rules. 
This decision led to a separate authorization bill for TAA, which extended the programs through 
the first session of the 113th Congress. 
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Appendix. TAA Reauthorization, 1962-2011 
Year Bill Title Public Law Extension Date Length 
1962 Trade Expansion Act of 1962 P.L. 87-794 Permanent  
1974 Trade Act of 1974 P.L. 93-618 Sept. 30, 1982 8 years 
1981 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 P.L. 97-35 Sept. 30, 1983 1 year 
1983 A bill to Amend the International Coffee 
Agreement Act of 1983 
P.L. 98-120 Sept. 30, 1985 2 years 
1984 Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 P.L. 98-369 Nov. 15, 1985 10 weeks 
1985 Emergency Extension Act of 1985 P.L. 99-107 Dec. 19, 1985 5 weeks 
 Lapses until March 1986    
1986 Deficit Reduction Amendments Act of 1985 P.L. 99-272 Sept. 30, 1991 6 years 
1988 Omnibus Trade & Competitiveness Act P.L. 100-418 Sept. 30, 1993 2 years 
1993 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 P.L. 103-66 Sept. 30, 1998 5 years 
1998 District of Columbia Appropriations  June 30, 1999 9 months 
1999 Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2000 P.L. 106-113 Sept. 30, 2001 2¼ years 
 Lapses Sept. 30, 2001, to August 6, 2002    
2002 Trade Act of 2002 P.L. 107-210 Sept. 30, 2007 5 years 
2007 TAA Extension Act P.L. 110-89 Dec. 31, 2007 3 months 
 Lapses Dec. 31, 2007, to Feb. 17, 2009    
2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2008a P.L. 110-161 Dec. 31, 2008 1 year 
2009 Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, 
and Continuing Appropriations Act of 2009a 
P.L. 110-329 Feb. 2009 2 months 
2009 American Recovery & Reinvestment Act 
(ARRA) of 2009b 
P.L. 111-5 Dec. 31, 2010 2 years 
2010 Omnibus Trade Act of 2010b P.L. 111-344 Feb. 12, 2012 13 months 
2011 The Trade Adjustment Assistance Act of 2011 P.L. 112-40 Dec. 31, 2013 34 months 
Source: CRS. 
a. Appropriations only.  
b. Expanded provisions under the ARRA lapsed from February 12, 2011, to October 2011. TAA programs 
were reauthorized at pre-ARRA levels until February 12, 2012, in the Omnibus Trade Act of 2010. 
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